[DOWNLOAD] "Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co." by Supreme Court of Illinois " Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co.
- Author : Supreme Court of Illinois
- Release Date : January 29, 1974
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 66 KB
Description
On May 29, 1969, plaintiffs, Martha Berry and her husband, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County which was thereafter amended. In a second amended complaint Martha Berry (hereafter referred to as plaintiff) sought damages for injuries allegedly sustained by her after having taken a birth-control pill commonly known as Enovid. This drug was manufactured by defendant G.D. Searle & Co. (hereafter Searle), and prescribed and sold to her on and before May 29, 1965, by the co-defendant, Planned Parenthood Association of Chicago (hereafter Association). The initial action was filed more than two years after plaintiff sustained her alleged injury, and the circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss counts I and II of the second amended complaint, holding that recovery thereunder was barred by section 14 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 83, par. 15). This appeal follows. The first count was premised upon a breach of an implied warranty of the fitness of the product for a particular purpose as set forth in section 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 26, par. 2-315). It averred that notwithstanding this implied warranty Enovid caused serious and dangerous side effects upon the user, including constriction of blood vessels, and that neither defendant warned of this possibility; that on or about May 30, 1965, as a result of the breach of this warranty, plaintiff suffered a cerebral vascular accident (stroke) and paralysis of portions of her body after ingesting the drug; and that defendants received notice of the purported breach of warranty within a reasonable time. The second count, which was predicated upon a theory of strict liability in tort, asserted that the drug was unreasonably dangerous to its users for the specific reason heretofore mentioned; that this dangerous condition existed from the time the drug was manufactured; and that plaintiff did not learn that this drug caused her injury until June 1, 1967.